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ABSTRACT 
 Many scholars question the priority enjoyed by secured debt in 
bankruptcy. They fear that secured debt will be used to inefficiently 
redistribute value away from preexisting unprotected creditors of a 
firm. These scholars advocate a host of legal innovations, such as 
“superpriority” for tort claimants with respect to other creditors, to 
mitigate the redistributional problem. Other scholars minimize the 
redistributional problem, however, and argue that priority for secured 
credit is efficient. To help resolve this debate, this Article examines the 
redistributional theory from an empirical perspective. In particular, it 
focuses on secured debt usage by publicly traded firms facing large 
tort liabilities (“high-tort” firms). In theory, secured debt should be 
attractive for high-tort firms because they have a large class of 
unsecured and uncovenanted creditors (tort claimants) exposed to 
redistribution in bankruptcy through the use of secured credit. The 
Article’s empirical analysis contradicts the redistributional theory’s 
prediction, however. High-tort firms have unusually low amounts of 
secured debt. Although this result is very difficult to explain under the 
redistributional theory, it can readily be explained according to other 
theories of secured debt. Several important policy implications for 
bankruptcy priorities follow from these findings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Secured creditors enjoy priority status in bankruptcy with respect 
to other creditors.1 Although the rule is well established, its 
desirability is the subject of decades of scholarly debate.2 Some 
 
 1. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361–364 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The priority of secured creditors is 
protected by the “adequate protection” clauses of these sections, which ensure that holders of 
collateral whose repossession has been stayed by bankruptcy should receive the full amount of 
their secured claim by the end of the bankruptcy process. 
 2. Professor Robert Scott’s invaluable law review article dates the debate to 1979. Robert 
E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 1437 n.1 (1997) 
[hereinafter Scott, Truth About Secured Financing]. For other articles developing the debate, 
see generally Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 
J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, The Importance of Priority, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
1420 (1997); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy 
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academics assert that priority for secured debt promotes inefficient 
uses of secured debt as a means of redistributing value away from 
unsecured creditors toward those with collateral.3 Late-arriving 
secured creditors can leapfrog earlier unsecured creditors, 
redistributing value to the benefit of the issuer and the secured 
creditor but to the detriment of unsecured creditors and, possibly, to 
social welfare (in the Kaldor-Hicks sense). Other scholars minimize 
the salience of the redistributive motive and claim that the priority of 
secured debt mitigates agency conflicts between borrowers and 
 
Case 1]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997) 
[hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2]; F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 
72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986); David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1635 (1998); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the 
Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in 
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349 (1997) [hereinafter Harris & Mooney, Measuring the 
Social Costs]; Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security 
Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994) [hereinafter Harris & 
Mooney, Property-Based Theory]; John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 47 (1995); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and 
Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, 
Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2103 (1994); Saul Levmore, Monitors and 
Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the 
Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, 
Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1992); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy 
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997); Alan Schwartz, 
The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) [hereinafter Schwartz, 
The Continuing Puzzle]; Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1396 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Priority Contracts]; Alan Schwartz, 
Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Bankruptcy Priorities]; Alan Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of 
Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2073, 2075–81 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, Taking the 
Analysis of Security Seriously]; Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory]; Paul M. Shupack, Solving the 
Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989); George G. Triantis, A Free-
Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155 (1994) 
[hereinafter Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory]; George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under 
Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, Making 
Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
1373 (1997); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. 
L. REV. 473 (1984). 
 3. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 859; Bebchuk & Fried, 
Uneasy Case 2, supra note 2, at 1314–15; Hudson, supra note 2, at 47; LoPucki, supra note 2, at 
1891; Warren, supra note 2, at 1389–90. 
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lenders and facilitates efficient loans that could not occur if secured 
credit were not awarded priority.4 
In a law review article, Professor Robert Scott summarized the 
debate as follows: 
To some extent, [the] leverage [afforded by secured debt] seems to 
be a singularly useful means of reducing conflicts of interest inherent 
in financial contracting relationships. These benefits are efficiency 
enhancing. To some degree, however, [the] leverage [afforded by 
secured debt] also appears to be a singularly useful means of 
enhancing the creditor’s probability of repayment relative to other 
creditors. If, as seems plausible, some (or many) of these other 
creditors do not adjust to this reduction in bankruptcy share, there is 
a redistributional benefit to the creditor that the debtor does not 
fully internalize in assessing its total interest bill. This, then, would 
lead to some inefficient uses of security (as well as raise problems of 
distributional fairness). The question, in short, is simple: What are 
the relative values of these two offsetting effects? At this point we 
do not have a clue.5 
This Article attempts to “get a clue” by testing the predictive 
value of the redistributional theory of secured debt. If redistribution 
constitutes a principal motive for firms’ use of secured debt, then 
firms with greater opportunities for redistribution should issue more 
secured debt than other firms.6 In particular, firms facing outsized, 
noninsurable tort liabilities should issue large amounts of secured 
debt. Tort claimants are the paradigmatic “nonadjusting” unsecured 
creditor.7 Tort claimants cannot demand covenants to prevent 
leapfrogging by later secured creditors, nor can they demand an 
interest rate premium in lieu of covenant protection.8 Unlike other 
 
 4. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 2, at 1643–46; Harris & Mooney, Measuring the Social 
Costs, supra note 2, at 1350; Harris & Mooney, Property-Based Theory, supra note 2, at 2021–22; 
Kanda & Levmore, supra note 2, at 2111–14; Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 432–33; Schwartz, 
Priority Contracts, supra note 2, at 1397–98. 
 5. Scott, Truth About Secured Financing, supra note 2, at 1461. 
 6. See Schwartz, Bankruptcy Priorities, supra note 2, at 30 (stating that the “distributional 
explanation predicts that firms will issue secured debt only when a substantial number of their 
creditors are uninformed”). 
 7. For example, tort claimants are listed first in the taxonomy of nonadjusting creditors 
described by Bebchuk and Fried. Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 882. 
 8. Late-arriving tort creditors—those who bring their successful suits in or just near 
bankruptcy—can obviously not obtain before their claim is brought to judgment or settled. 
Known tort creditors may sell their claims to other parties. The price at which these claims will 
be sold will be discounted to reflect the ability of the company to adulterate the value of the tort 
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creditors, they are exogenously unsecured (by virtue of the legal 
system). Firms facing large (and potentially terminal) liabilities 
should capitalize on this vulnerability by issuing large amounts of 
redistributive secured debt. The tortfeasing firm would pay lower 
interest rates on secured debt than on unsecured debt because a 
secured creditor will be paid in full before tort claimants receive any 
distribution should the tort liability ultimately force the company into 
bankruptcy. 
Other rationales for secured debt make sharply contrasting 
predictions for the amount of secured debt likely to be issued by firms 
facing large tort liabilities (“high-tort firms”). Although such firms 
are at risk of bankruptcy, they are unlikely to experience the agency 
problems thought to characterize secured debt issuers under alternate 
theories of secured debt. For example, secured debt is unlikely to 
prevent a high-tort firm from “risk shifting” toward riskier projects 
because the firm’s relatively stable income is not the source of the 
bankruptcy risk; instead it is the firm’s tort liabilities that are the 
problem. Similarly, firms facing large tort liabilities, such as tobacco 
firms, are not the type of firms likely to need secured debt as a 
commitment device.9 Large tobacco firms can credibly commit to 
avoid debt dilution through the use of covenants, making costly 
secured debt unattractive as a commitment device. Finally, high-tort 
firms may produce stable cash flows—limiting the attractiveness of 
the “financial slack” proffered by secured debt.10 
Consequently, high-tort firms offer an ideal test of the predictive 
value of the redistributive theory of secured debt. If redistribution is a 
prime motive for secured debt, then such firms should issue large 
amounts of secured debt. If redistribution is relatively unimportant, 
then firms facing large tort liabilities should not issue unusual 
amounts of secured debt. 
The “answer” to the question of whether or not high-tort firms 
issue large amounts of secured debt has normative implications for 
many of the debates raging around the priority of secured debt. First, 
many commentators, assuming that redistribution from tort claimants 
 
claim by issuing secured debt. Thus, the value of any tort claim that has not been paid in full is 
affected by the possibility of redistribution. 
 9. See Schwartz, Priority Contracts, supra note 2, at 1412 (suggesting that borrowers who 
cannot credibly commit to obey nondilution covenants may choose to issue secured debt). 
 10. See George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 35–37 (2000). 
03__LISTOKIN.DOC 4/16/2008  8:34:31 AM 
1042 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1037 
occurs, have argued for a change in legal regime toward one awarding 
superpriority to tort claimants with respect to other creditors.11 If tort 
liabilities lead to redistributive secured debt issuance, then priority 
for secured creditors with respect to tort claimants is both unfair and 
inefficient. Secured creditor priority is unfair because tort claimants 
receive less than they are entitled to and cannot receive a higher 
award to compensate them for the risk that secured claimants will 
subordinate their claims in bankruptcy. It is inefficient because it 
dilutes the incentives for potential tortfeasing companies to take 
precautions against injuries and encourages such companies to use 
secured debt in situations in which, redistribution aside, they would 
prefer to issue unsecured debt. As a result, superpriority for tort 
claimants makes good sense—assuming that firms actually use 
secured debt to expropriate value from tort claimants.12 
Similarly, other commentators have pointed to redistribution as a 
rationale for adjusting the priority of secured credit more generally. 
Professors Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried explain that tort 
claimants are not the only nonadjusting creditors. Other nonadjusting 
creditors include trade creditors and all prior unsecured creditors of a 
debtor who is considering borrowing on a secured basis.13 Because 
secured credit redistributes value away from these third parties, 
secured debt may exceed the socially efficient amount.14 To prevent 
 
 11. E.g., Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811, 826 (1994); 
Kathryn R. Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for the Debtor’s 
Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 819, 851–63 (1988); Rebecca J. Huss, 
Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law Doctrine 
into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 133 (2001) (arguing that tort claims should be given 
superpriority in bankruptcy because tort creditors have no ability to allocate risks or demand 
security); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1565, 1643 (1991); LoPucki, supra note 2, at 1913; Note, Switching Priorities: Elevating the Status 
of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2541, 2562 
(2003). See generally Andrew Price, Note, Tort Creditor Superpriority and Other Proposed 
Solutions to Corporate Limited Liability and the Problem of Externalities, 2 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 439 (1995). 
 12. Awarding superpriority to tort claimants may prove to be sound policy even if secured 
debt is not used to redistribute value away from secured creditors. The arguments presented 
here and elsewhere in favor of superpriority will not apply, however. Instead, scholars must 
formulate new arguments in favor of the change. 
 13. These nonadjusting creditors are different from tort creditors in that they may demand 
a contractual premium in exchange for accepting unsecured status. Once they sign their 
contracts, however, they instantly become nonadjusting. 
 14. This argument alone explains too much, as it implies that all credit should be secured. 
See Adler, supra note 2, at 74; Schwartz, Bankruptcy Priorities, supra note 2, at 30–33. As a 
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inefficient use of secured debt, Bebchuk and Fried, among others, 
advocate deviations from full priority for secured credit in favor of 
adjustable rules that enable sharing of assets between secured and 
unsecured creditors.15 Again, however, if redistribution is not an 
empirically important phenomenon, then the impetus for this change 
disappears. 
Finally, a finding that high-liability companies issue secured debt 
would provide evidence to support the claim that companies alter 
their capital structure to avoid tort liability.16 If companies behave this 
way, then fears about the “death of liability” are more than idle 
worries and reforms to the tort system will be essential to prevent 
companies from avoiding liability through legal manipulations.17 If 
companies do not use secured credit to avoid liability, however, then 
it is unlikely that companies will favor more radical rearrangements 
to capital structure when the benefits of avoiding liability are more 
nebulous than the case of secured credit. In total, a finding that 
companies facing large tort liabilities “load up” on secured debt 
would have important implications for the future direction of the law 
at the intersection of bankruptcy, corporate law, torts, and secured 
transactions. 
Although the stakes are high, there has been little empirical 
investigation of the use of secured credit to redistribute value away 
from tort creditors. Indeed, one scholar decried the general “lack [of] 
any persuasive empirical data” in the secured debt literature.18 
Although several financial and legal scholars have investigated the 
use of secured lending, these papers have either ignored the 
redistributive motive or focused on the use of secured credit for 
 
result, Bebchuk and Fried include redistribution as one of several explanations for secured debt. 
Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 880–904. 
 15. Even if these nonadjusting creditors receive a premium for the risk of redistribution, 
secured debt will be used too frequently from an efficiency standpoint, with a resultant 
deadweight loss. See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 880–904. 
 16. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks, Liability and Organizational Choice, 45 J.L. & 
ECON. 91 (2002) (finding that companies expanded their boundaries in response to the threat of 
higher liability from environmental damages); Al H. Ringleb & Steven N. Wiggins, Liability and 
Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards, 98 J. POL. ECON. 574 (1990) (finding that exposure to 
significant liability leads to smaller, judgment-proof companies). 
 17. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1996) 
(noting that if judgments of liability cannot be enforced, then “liability is merely symbolic”). 
 18. Scott, Truth About Secured Financing, supra note 2, at 1437; see also Warren, supra 
note 2, at 1374 (noting that empirical questions have not been addressed in any detail). 
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redistribution against general unsecured creditors.19 To this point, the 
use of secured credit to redistribute value away from tort claimants 
remains unexplored, in spite of the fact that redistribution from tort 
claimants is both interesting by itself and provides an ideal test case 
for the redistributive theory more generally. 
This Article tests the hypothesis that firms facing large tort 
liabilities will redistribute value away from tort claimants using 
secured debt. As described, tort claimants are the paradigmatic 
example of the unsecured creditor in danger of expropriation through 
the use of secured debt. First, the Article examines several different 
methods of identifying companies at high risk for mass tort 
bankruptcies. Next, it collects and evaluates financial data for these 
companies and for other publicly traded companies from the 
Compustat database published by Standard & Poor’s. Using several 
methods of statistical analysis and controlling for many other factors, 
the Article compares the amount of secured debt held by high-tort 
firms to the amount of secured debt held by otherwise similar 
companies that do not face large tort liabilities. 
The results are striking. Companies facing large tort liabilities  
do not issue abnormal amounts of secured debt. Instead, high-tort 
firms appear to issue less secured debt than otherwise similar 
companies not facing bankruptcy. Moreover, these results are robust 
to many specifications, strongly suggesting that these findings are not 
the result of some quirk in the data, but rather are a genuine 
phenomenon. Individual examples comport with the statistical trends. 
For example, companies headed for mass tort bankruptcy as a result 
of asbestos liability have considerably less secured debt one year 
before declaring than the average firm within one year of a 
bankruptcy declaration.20 Large cigarette manufacturers also are 
likely candidates to use secured debt to redistribute value away from 
tort creditors should tort liabilities bankrupt these firms. And yet 
 
 19. Several empirical finance papers study the priority pattern of lending in light of 
economic theories of corporate finance. See, e.g., Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., 
The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities, 50 J. FIN. 899, 899 (1995); Allen N. Berger & 
Gregory F. Udell, Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk, 25 J. MONETARY ECON. 21, 21 
(1990). These papers do not consider the role of tort liability or the priority status of tort 
creditors in their consideration of loan priorities, however. In an important paper, Professor 
Ronald Mann interviewed individuals involved in secured lending and examined their attitudes 
with respect to redistribution. Mann, supra note 2, at 630. Mann, however, also does not 
examine the implications of tort claimants for the desirability of secured lending. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
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Phillip Morris, the nation’s largest tobacco company, had no secured 
debt in the years 2000 and 2001. 
The results contradict the redistributional theory for the use of 
secured debt. If redistribution does not occur against nonadjusting 
tort claimants, it is unlikely to occur in other contexts. The results, 
however, are consistent with the “reduction of agency costs” 
explanation for secured debt. Tobacco companies and companies 
with large asbestos liabilities, for example, are not like other firms in 
financial distress. They are successful companies in relatively mature 
industries. Firms in industries such as these encounter relatively small 
agency costs relative to other firms. As a result, the agency-mitigating 
features of secured debt are relatively unattractive to these firms. If 
firms issue secured debt primarily to mitigate agency costs (and not 
for redistribution), then these firms should not have large amounts of 
secured debt—a prediction confirmed by the findings presented in 
this Article. 
Indeed, firms with large tort liabilities may be particularly averse 
to secured debt. A number of observers have noted that secured 
creditors have a tendency to prefer liquidation over reorganization in 
bankruptcy.21 Mass tort bankruptcy candidates are more likely to be 
viable firms than other firms in financial distress—their bankruptcy is 
not the result of a failing business model, but rather is caused by tort. 
As a result, reorganization will tend to be more attractive for these 
firms than others. Knowing this, a firm at risk of mass tort bankruptcy 
may prefer to limit the amount of secured debt to facilitate a 
successful reorganization in bankruptcy. 
Several normative recommendations follow from these results. 
First, superpriority for tort claimants in bankruptcy solves a problem 
that is not empirically significant. If firms are not expropriating value 
from tort claimants under the present priority scheme, then the 
inefficiencies and inequities decried by advocates for superpriority 
are exaggerated. Although there are still justifications for 
superpriority, the benefits of the change must be weighed against the 
costs of a change in legal regime. Second, as Professor Scott notes, “if 
 
 21. See, e.g., J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 246 
(1991). For a judicial recognition of this tendency of secured creditors, see In re Bermec Corp., 
445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971) (“We are conscious of the deep concern of the manufacturing 
secured creditors lest their security depreciate beyond adequate salvage, but we must balance 
that with the Congressional mandate to encourage attempts at corporate reorganization where 
there is a reasonable possibility of success.”). 
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nonadjusting creditors are statistically insignificant . . . then the 
redistributional claim largely fails and the observed preference of 
many market actors for secured credit is strong evidence of the 
dominating effects of its cost-reducing properties.”22 Therefore, 
proposals to change the prevailing regime of full priority for secured 
claims on behalf of nonadjusting creditors are empirically 
unsupported. Finally, these results contradict those scholars 
advocating changes in liability regimes because of fears that firms 
adjust their capital structure to minimize liability.23 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the secured 
debt debate and provides a theoretical framework for the empirical 
results presented. Part II describes the data collection process and 
examines means of identifying high-tort-risk companies. Part III 
presents statistical analysis of the relation between tort risk and 
secured debt usage. Part IV evaluates and interprets the results in the 
context of the theoretical framework presented in Part I. 
I.  EXPLAINING THE USE OF SECURED  
DEBT AND EVALUATING SECURED DEBT’S EFFICIENCY 
Firms face a choice between issuing secured and unsecured debt. 
Unsurprisingly, secured debt has both benefits and costs relative to 
unsecured debt. Secured debt’s priority status in bankruptcy plays an 
important role in defining these benefits and costs.24 The debate 
described in the Introduction and the empirical analysis presented in 
Part III examine the relative size and importance of these costs and 
benefits. To provide a framework for the empirical examination, this 
Part describes the theoretical costs and benefits of secured debt and 
examines how different perceptions of these costs and benefits leads 
directly to varying normative conclusions about the desirability of 
secured debt’s priority. 
 
 22. Scott, Truth About Secured Financing, supra note 2, at 1462. 
 23. Note that many of these conclusions are cautionary in nature. The empirical results 
serve more to contradict one theory of secured debt—the redistributional theory—than to 
support another theory in particular. 
 24. These benefits and costs must vary from firm to firm because some firms issue no 
secured debt, others issue only secured debt, and a third category issues both secured and 
unsecured types. See Adler, supra note 2, at 74 (describing the puzzle that secured credit is 
“valuable but is not ubiquitous”). Professor Adler’s observation relies heavily on earlier work 
by Professor Alan Schwartz. Schwartz, Bankruptcy Priorities, supra note 2, at 24–25. Therefore 
any theory that predicts that secured debt should be either nonexistent or ubiquitous fails the 
armchair verification test. 
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A. The Costs of Secured Debt 
Scholars have identified several costs associated with secured 
debt with respect to other forms of debt. Professors Bebchuk and 
Fried identify three primary categories of costs: “(1) ‘contracting 
costs’—including the cost of negotiating and perfecting the security 
interest; (2) ‘enforcement costs’—the costs of policing the collateral; 
and, perhaps most importantly, (3) ‘opportunity costs’—the costs 
created when the security interest prevents the borrower from 
pursuing efficient activities.”25 Although the secured lender may 
directly bear many of these costs, the debtor must pay a higher 
interest rate to compensate the lender for these expenses. 
Professor Ronald Mann’s investigation suggests that 
enforcement costs are considerably higher for secured loans than for 
unsecured loans.26 Secured lenders must monitor their securities to 
ensure that their rights are protected. This monitoring is costly.27 
The largest cost associated with secured debt relative to 
unsecured is the prevention of efficient investment activities by the 
debtor. A secured lender may prevent a debtor from using its 
collateral in a productive investment if it perceives that the 
investment may reduce the lender’s recovery (even if the investment 
is profitable on average). The lender’s goal is to maximize its own 
recovery, and not the total value of the firm. Renegotiation of a 
secured loan may ameliorate this problem, but the renegotiation is 
itself costly. As one borrower quoted by Professor Mann stated about 
a secured loan, “You just don’t have the same flexibility of dealing 
with your properties as if you owned them unencumbered.”28 This loss 
of flexibility is costly for the secured debt issuer. 
Secured credit may also increase the cost of reorganization in 
bankruptcy. Because secured creditors have priority, they tend to 
prefer low-risk bankruptcy strategies such as liquidation, even if 
liquidation destroys value.29 Furthermore, secured debt may increase 
 
 25. Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 877. 
 26. See Mann, supra note 2, at 663 (noting that information costs “strongly encourage 
unsecured credit in transactions involving large borrowers”). 
 27. See id. at 663–64. Mann notes that these costs will only be incurred because there is a 
benefit in increased repayment probabilities. Id. at 663. Part I.B.2 examines these benefits. 
 28. See id. at 665 (quoting Telephone Interview, Joseph W. Robertson, Jr., Chief Financial 
Officer, Weingarten Realty Investors (July 11, 1995)). 
 29. See Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 
Liquidation vs. Chapter 11 Reorganization 4 (Int’l Center for Fin. at Yale Sch. of Mgmt., 
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free-rider problems. The firm’s bundle of assets may be worth more 
together than apart. Each secured creditor may attempt to extract this 
value from other creditors by attempting to hinder the attempted 
reorganization. Because the secured creditor with priority loses little 
if negotiations fail and end in liquidation and has a right that is clearly 
associated with a particular asset, the secured creditor is uniquely 
placed to “hold up” the negotiations and demand excess value.30 As a 
result, large amounts of secured debt may obstruct efficient 
bankruptcy reorganizations—an important additional cost created by 
secured as opposed to unsecured debt. 
Finally, the availability of security with a priority claim in 
bankruptcy raises a firm’s cost of lending more generally. Unsecured 
creditors will demand costly covenants restricting later secured debt 
or an interest rate premium to protect themselves against the risk that 
the issuance of later secured debt may dilute the value of their 
claims.31 In both cases, a firm must pay a higher price for unsecured 
credit. 
B. The Benefits of Secured Debt 
Given the costs described in Section A, secured debt must offer 
offsetting benefits if debtors are ever to issue security. Unfortunately, 
there is less consensus about the benefits of secured debt to firms 
than there is regarding the costs. This Section details some of the 
many benefits proposed by scholars as explanations for the existence 
of secured debt. 
1. Controlling Monitoring and Agency Costs.  Most attempts to 
define the benefits of secured debt “focus on the ways in which 
secured credit can better control agency costs within the firm by 
reducing conflicts of interest between the debtor’s managers 
(representing the residual equity claimants) and the firm’s debt 
holders.”32 Better control of agency costs reduces the interest rate a 
 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-13, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=523562 (stating that when banks are secured creditors, they prefer firms 
to be liquidated and do not favor reorganizations). 
 30. See Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of 
Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (1996). 
 31. This is part of what Professor Alan Schwartz has termed the “puzzle of secured debt.” 
See Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, supra note 2, at 2079–80. 
 32. See Scott, Truth About Secured Financing, supra note 2, at 1448. 
03__LISTOKIN.DOC 4/16/2008  8:34:31 AM 
2008] BANKRUPTCY 1049 
firm must pay; the more confident the lender is that the firm will not 
behave opportunistically, the less of a premium the lender will 
demand.33 
Secured lending appears to offer a partial solution to the 
“overinvestment” or risk-alteration problem.34 Security enables a 
lender to exact harsh penalties on a debtor in the event of default. For 
example, the secured lender may foreclose on potentially critical 
assets. Thus, if a borrower attempts to engage in covenant-violating 
risk alteration, a secured lender has considerably more power than an 
unsecured lender to prevent opportunistic risk alteration.35 Because 
risk alteration may be inefficient, the leverage gained by the secured 
creditor may enable socially preferred outcomes. 
Secured lending may also mitigate the “underinvestment” 
problem.36 The underinvestment problem occurs when a firm chooses 
to reduce its investment in a project because it must share the benefits 
of the project with a creditor/joint venturer. Instead, the firm may 
prefer to invest in a less promising project in which the firm retains all 
the profits. Security enables creditors/joint venturers to prevent 
underinvestment. If a firm violates a covenant associated with a 
lending contract in a way that will reduce the creditor’s return, then 
the secured creditor can threaten to foreclose on the collateral. This 
 
 33. This discussion focuses on secured debt as a means of reducing risk alteration. Other 
agency costs related to theories of secured debt focus on secured debt’s ability to decrease 
monitoring costs. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 324–28 (1987); Buckley, supra 
note 2, at 1396; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 1150–51; Levmore, supra note 2, at 49. 
 34. For analyses of this issue, see Elazar Berkovitch & E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting 
and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives, 45 J. FIN. 765, 765 (1994); Bolton 
& Scharfstein, supra note 30, at 2; Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 2, at 901; Charles W. 
Smith & Jerold S. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. 
ECON. 117, 117 (1979). Another prominent explanation of secured debt (and priority rules more 
generally) on the basis of agency costs and primarily risk alteration-controlling properties is 
Kanda & Levmore, supra note 2, at 2106. 
 35. Many scholars list specific ways in which the security can reduce risk alteration. See, 
e.g., Carlson, supra note 2, at 1637; Rene M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured 
Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 502 (1985); Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory, supra note 2, at 
2157. For a list of means of risk alteration, see Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 
876. 
 36. Professor Stewart Myers offered the original explication of the underinvestment 
problem. See generally Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 
147, 147 (1977) (examining the “gap in modern finance theory on the issue of corporate debt 
policy”). The underinvestment problem was related to secured debt by Berkovitch & Kim, 
supra note 34, at 765–66, and Smith & Warner, supra note 34, at 119. 
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harsh penalty deters the firm from inefficiently starving the joint 
venture of funds. 
Similarly, secured lending may reduce the number of 
“opportunistic” defaults.37 An opportunistic debtor will declare 
bankruptcy when there is no shortage of liquidity if it believes that a 
bankruptcy reorganization will improve its credit terms. In response, 
a lender must demand potentially excessive interest rate premiums to 
compensate for the strategic default risk. Secured debt may offer 
another solution. Because secured debt makes bankruptcy 
reorganization more costly and uncertain,38 it will deter opportunistic 
bankruptcy declarations. When opportunistic bankruptcies are a large 
risk, the secured debt solution may be more attractive. When 
opportunistic bankruptcies are unlikely, however, secured debt will 
be less attractive because it will raise the cost of potentially efficient 
bankruptcy reorganizations.39 
 
 37. This discussion borrows from the work of Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 30, at 2. 
 38. See supra note 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 39. In their important article, Professors Bebchuk and Fried argue that these benefits of 
secured debt are independent of secured debt’s priority. Instead, they argue that the benefits 
arise from “the special rights accorded to secured creditors outside of bankruptcy.” Bebchuk & 
Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 875. Indeed, the unique characteristics of secured debt, 
such as the right to foreclose on an asset in response to default, are related to state law rights of 
foreclosure and not to the priority of security in bankruptcy. Bebchuk and Fried’s claim that the 
agency cost–reduction abilities of secured debt is independent of bankruptcy priority is 
incomplete, however. Bebchuk and Fried correctly note that foreclosure is a state law right that 
enables a creditor to effectively deter opportunistic behavior (such as risk alteration) by the 
debtor. Id. They fail to discern, however, that the effectiveness of the foreclosure deterrent 
depends critically on the priority that secured credit receives in bankruptcy. The argument runs 
as follows: Suppose that secured creditors do not enjoy priority in bankruptcy. Suppose further 
that a debtor attempts to violate the terms of a secured debt contract and engages in 
opportunistic risk-altering behavior. The secured creditor threatens to foreclose, seeking to 
dissuade the debtor from engaging in risk alteration. In turn, the debtor threatens to declare 
bankruptcy. If the secured debtor does not enjoy priority in bankruptcy, then the debtor’s 
counterthreat is effective. The secured creditor will be reluctant to foreclose because it risks 
losing value while sharing priority with other creditors. The state law right of foreclosure is 
toothless if secured creditors do not enjoy priority in bankruptcy. When the secured creditors 
enjoy priority, however, the debtor’s bankruptcy threat does not intimidate the secured creditor, 
which can be confident that it will recover its loan (along with interest) because it enjoys priority 
in bankruptcy. Indeed, secured lenders are more likely to place a creditor in bankruptcy than 
other lenders, suggesting that they are far less afraid of bankruptcy, and therefore better able to 
exercise leverage, than other creditors. 
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2. Redistribution—Priority Related.  Redistribution offers 
another explanation for the use of secured debt.40 The redistributional 
capacities of secured debt operate as follows: First, suppose that a 
firm has nonadjusting creditors. Nonadjusting creditors are creditors 
who do not adjust the interest rate charged to the firm in response to 
events that alter the expected recovery of the loan should bankruptcy 
occur. Next, suppose that the firm needs to issue debt and must 
choose between secured and unsecured debt. If the firm issues 
secured debt, then the new creditor will demand a lower interest rate 
as compared with unsecured debt because the new creditor will be 
more confident of recovery in bankruptcy due to secured debt’s 
priority. Secured debt reduces the value of nonadjusting creditors’ 
claims, however. Because the new creditor’s claims are secured, the 
nonadjusting creditors will only recover in bankruptcy after the 
secured creditors are paid in full. Thus, more secured credit means 
lower recoveries for other creditors. In response to this effect, 
preexisting creditors should charge a higher interest rate to 
compensate for the increased risk of nonrecovery in bankruptcy or 
demand covenants to limit the probability of redistribution.41 For a 
variety of reasons, nonadjusting creditors do not do so.42 As a result, 
the firm can issue new secured debt and obtain a lower interest rate, 
thereby “redistributing” value away from the nonadjusting creditors 
whose claims have been diluted through the use of security.43 
Secured debt’s redistributional benefits to a firm stem from the 
existence of nonadjusting creditors. Scholars have identified several 
groups of nonadjusting creditors.44 These include (1) private 
involuntary creditors such as tort claimants, (2) government tax and 
regulatory claims, (3) voluntary creditors with small claims, and (4) 
prior voluntary creditors.45 The third and fourth classes of 
nonadjusting creditors may adjust their interest rate to reflect 
 
 40. See, e.g., Schwartz, Bankruptcy Priorities, supra note 2, at 30–33; James H. Scott, 
Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. FIN. 1, 1 (1977); James H. Scott, 
Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Reply, 34 J. FIN. 253, 253 (1979). See 
generally Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2 (presenting a new and more general 
analysis of the redistributional theory). 
 41. See, e.g., Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 
TUL. L. REV. 101, 125–26 (1997); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 7–8. 
 42. See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 885–86. 
 43. See id. at 864–66. 
 44. See id. at 882–91. 
 45. Id. 
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nonadjustment. The first two classes cannot. Of these classes, the 
most frequently noted and commented upon are tort claimants.46 
Tort claimants become creditors when firms do not carry enough 
insurance to cover all tort claims. Insurance may not cover all tort 
claims because insurers insist on a coverage limit or because firms 
have an incentive to underinsure.47 Whatever the cause, when firms 
are underinsured, tort victims of the firm must recover from the firm 
rather than the firm’s insurer. The size of the tort claimant’s claim is 
fixed by the size of damages.48 The tort claimant is therefore the 
paradigmatic nonadjusting creditor—the tort claimant cannot claim 
additional compensation if a later secured loan reduces the expected 
tort recovery in bankruptcy. Moreover, tort claimants, as involuntary 
creditors, enjoy no contractual protections against redistribution such 
as covenants. As a result, tort claimants are highly exposed to 
redistribution. A firm with many tort creditors should pay a 
considerably lower interest rate for secured debt, which enjoys 
priority over the tort creditors, as opposed to unsecured debt, which 
must share firm assets pro rata with the tort claimants.49 The 
redistributional theory suggests that firms should therefore issue 
secured debt. Tort claimants will suffer from the secured debt, as the 
tort claimant’s bankruptcy share is reduced without any 
countervailing increase in payoffs.50 
 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 882 (presenting tort claimants as the first type of creditor in their 
taxonomy of nonadjusting creditors); LoPucki, supra note 2, at 1898–99; Scott, Bankruptcy, 
Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, supra note 40 at 2–3; Shupack, supra note 2, at 
1094–95. 
 47. See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 882; Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 
1889 (1991). 
 48. This is especially true for late-arriving tort claimants whose claims arise in or near 
bankruptcy, precluding the possibility of compensation for nonadjustment through higher 
interest rates. 
 49. Because fraudulent conveyance doctrines in bankruptcy only apply to transactions 
made within two years of filing and exempt transactions for which “reasonably equivalent” 
value was paid, “fraudulent conveyance” offers limited protection for tort claimants against 
redistributional secured debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 50. The other classes of nonadjusting creditors may suffer from similar forms of 
redistribution. These nonadjusting creditors may demand interest rate premiums to compensate 
for potential redistribution or they may demand contractual protections instead. Although there 
may still be some inefficiencies associated with redistributional secured debt in these contexts, 
they are much less problematic than the case of involuntary creditors. Redistribution does not 
necessarily imply that a firm’s incentives to take precautions against torts will be reduced. For a 
discussion, see Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Strategic Judgment Proofing 14–15 (The 
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C. The Normative Implications of Theories of Secured Debt for 
Bankruptcy Priorities 
Whether or not secured debt should enjoy priority in bankruptcy 
depends upon the relative predictive accuracy of the two theories of 
secured debt presented in Section B. If the agency cost reduction 
theory is primarily correct in describing secured debt usage, then 
secured debt should receive priority over other types of debt. Priority 
increases the leverage the secured lender enjoys over the creditor. In 
turn, this leverage enables the secured lender to reduce potentially 
inefficient opportunistic behavior by the debtor. Any reduction in 
priority for secured credit may reduce leverage and inhibit the 
usefulness of secured debt as an agency cost–reducing tool. 
If one finds that firms issue secured debt for redistributional 
reasons, by contrast, then priority for secured debt is less desirable.51 
Redistribution leads to inefficiencies. Redistribution involves the 
transfer of value from nonadjusting creditors to newly arriving 
secured creditors. No value is created. Instead, value is shuffled. If 
secured debt costs more to issue than unsecured debt (for example, if 
transactions costs are higher in the case of secured loans), then 
secured loans would consume valuable resources for a benefit, 
redistribution, that transfers but does not create wealth—an 
inefficient outcome. Secured debt issued for redistributional reasons 
also may lead to other inefficiencies. In the tort context, for example, 
redistribution may lead to excessively low levels of precaution.  
Suppose a firm with no insurance commits a large tort that 
threatens to force the firm into bankruptcy. If the firm cannot issue 
debt with priority over tort claimants, then it will be forced to borrow 
at high rates; contract creditors will know that they will be forced to 
share pro rata with the large group of tort creditors in the event of 
bankruptcy and will demand to be compensated accordingly. In this 
situation, the firm will take precautions to avoid mass torts, which 
raise the firm’s cost of credit. 
Now suppose, however, that secured debt enjoys priority over 
tort claimants and that firms issue secured debt for redistributional 
reasons. In this scenario, the firm’s incentives for precaution are 
 
Center for the Study of Indus. Org. at Northwestern U., Working Paper No. 0081, 2006), 
available at http://www.wcas.northwestern.edu/csio/Papers/2006/CSIO-WP-0081.pdf. 
 51. Of course, elements of both theories may be correct. The scholarly “debate” concerns 
the relative importance of the explanations in determining the “real-world” usage of secured 
debt. 
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greatly reduced. If a tort occurred, the firm’s cost of credit would not 
be greatly altered. Instead, the firm would issue secured debt. 
Contract creditors would not demand high interest rate premiums 
because the secured debt enjoys priority in bankruptcy and will be 
fully repaid before the large class of tort claimants receives anything. 
Thus, secured debt enables a firm to avoid the full costs of large 
torts.52 In response, a firm will have less of an incentive to take 
precautions to avoid the large tort. 
If redistribution is the primary motive for secured debt issuance, 
then priority for secured debt also leads to inequitable distributions. 
Whereas unsecured contract creditors are voluntarily unsecured and 
may receive compensation for their lack of security in the form of 
higher interest rates, tort claimants can not choose their security level. 
They are unwillingly exposed to redistribution. Furthermore, tort 
victims may have extraordinary liquidity needs that go unmet as a 
result of secured debt’s priority status.53 In response to these 
efficiency and equity concerns, many adherents of the redistributional 
theory have advocated a reduction in secured debt’s priority. 
Arguments to grant tort claimants priority over other creditors have a 
long history.54 One commentator describes the argument as follows: 
One effective way of deterring insolvency and encouraging optimal 
precaution levels would be to alter the priority scheme by giving tort 
creditors “superpriority” status. Under this system of superpriority, 
tort creditors would be paid before all priority creditors, secured 
creditors, and unsecured creditors. Since secured creditors would 
not be guaranteed payment at the head of the line in this regime, 
they would bear a portion of the risk of insolvency. Secured 
creditors would be forced to price risk into credit and would in turn 
force firms to internalize this risk through credit prices that 
correspond to precaution levels. . . . To force firms to include the full 
cost of accidents in business decisions, it is crucial to prioritize tort 
claims above all other priority claimants, even secured creditors. If 
tort debt were given priority, all creditors would have an incentive to 
monitor business risk-taking. Because they are often less diffuse and 
 
 52. In this context, secured debt also diminishes a firm’s incentives to purchase insurance. 
If a firm can use secured debt to avoid making payments to tort creditors and thereby diminish 
the amount ceded by equity claimants to tort claimants, there is less of a need to purchase 
insurance that covers the firm’s obligations to tort claimants. 
 53. See Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort 
Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2004). 
 54. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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more savvy than shareholders, creditors are in the best position to 
monitor levels of risky activity.55 
These arguments apply only to noninsured tort liabilities. When 
tort liabilities are insured, the insurer has an incentive to price the 
insurance appropriately and encourage the firm to take appropriate 
precautions. Furthermore, tort claimants do not suffer from priority 
for secured debt when firms are insured because the tort claimants 
receive compensation from the insurance company and not the 
tortfeasing firm. 
Superpriority for tort claimants is not the only proposed 
bankruptcy priority reform. Noting that tort claimants are not the 
only nonadjusting creditors, Professors Bebchuk and Fried advocate a 
“partial priority” rule for secured debt.56 They believe that partial 
priority would reduce the amount of secured debt issued for 
inefficient redistributional reasons.57 Furthermore, Professor Lynn 
LoPucki points to redistributional secured debt as an example of a 
growing trend leading toward the “death” of tort liability.58 
Concluding that tort claimant priority alone is insufficient in the face 
of this trend, Professor LoPucki considers unlimited shareholder 
liability and consensual creditor liability as potential solutions, but 
concludes that even these radical steps are potentially inadequate.59 
The debate over the primary reasons for secured debt’s usage 
involves high stakes. If secured debt is primarily used to reduce 
agency costs, then it is efficient for secured debt to enjoy priority over 
other debt. If secured debt’s primary use is to redistribute money 
from one class of creditors to another, however, then a host of 
changes to the bankruptcy priority rules are warranted. 
II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SECURED DEBT AND TORT LIABILITY 
The discussion in Part I described the importance of 
distinguishing between the agency-cost theory and the 
redistributional theory of secured debt. This Part presents an 
empirical framework for distinguishing between the two theories by 
 
 55. See Note, supra note 11, at 2562. 
 56. Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 866. Partial priority rules treat a 
portion of all secured debt as unsecured debt. 
 57. Id. 
 58. LoPucki, supra note 17, at 14–23. 
 59. Id. at 63. 
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focusing on secured debt usage in response to noninsured tort 
liabilities. 
A. Theories of Secured Debt and Predictions Regarding Secured Debt 
Usage and Tort Liability 
The redistributional theory predicts that firms with large, 
noninsured tort liabilities should have large amounts of secured 
debt,60 and recall that tort claimants are uniquely exposed to 
redistribution.61 They do not enjoy contractual protections such as 
covenants, nor do they voluntarily choose to forego such protection in 
exchange for greater compensation. As a result, firms faced with large 
tort liabilities have particularly strong motives to engage in 
redistribution. The spread in interest rates between secured and 
unsecured debt, and thus the payoff for engaging in redistribution 
through secured debt, should be particularly high for “high-tort” 
firms. (“High-tort” firms are those with large actual or potential tort 
liabilities, such as asbestos companies, tobacco companies, or nuclear 
power plant operators.) Moreover, high-tort firms will not have to 
engage in the hassle of renegotiating covenants with the large class of 
unsecured tort claimants. Thus, redistribution is at its easiest and 
most compelling for high-tort firms. If redistributional motives ever 
drive secured debt issuance, then firms facing noninsurable tort 
liabilities should engage in large amounts of secured borrowing 
relative to otherwise similar firms without large tort liabilities. 
By contrast, the agency-cost theories of secured debt do not 
predict that high-tort firms should issue large amounts of secured 
debt. Firms facing large tort liabilities are no more susceptible to “risk 
alteration” or other agency costs than other firms. Indeed, high-tort 
firms may be less susceptible to these agency costs than an average 
firms. High-tort firms’ risks stem primarily from partially exogenous, 
nonperformance-related factors such as court decisions.62 Other firms, 
by contrast, encounter more significant performance-related risk that 
can be adjusted through risk shifting and controlled with secured 
debt. Furthermore, many of the high-tort firms identified in this 
Article are in mature industries with stable cash flows, making them 
 
 60. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 61. See supra Part I. 
 62. Indeed, the tort risks often derive from decisions made by previous executives (such as 
in the case of asbestos and tobacco) and therefore have little if anything to do with the firm’s 
contemporaneous operating performance. 
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poor candidates for secured debt given secured debt’s undeniably 
high costs.63 
Thus, high-tort firms offer a compelling empirical test of the 
redistributional theory. If high-tort firms do not have large amounts 
of secured debt, it is unlikely that they use secured debt for large-
scale redistribution. 
B. Identifying Firms with Large Tort Liabilities 
This Article adopts several techniques for identifying firms with 
large, noninsurable tort liabilities. First, this study focuses on firms in 
industries with well-known, large mass tort liabilities. Firms with large 
asbestos liabilities are the most prominent example. To identify these 
firms, this Article draws upon the research of Professor Michelle 
White, who compiled a list of companies that declared bankruptcy as 
a result of asbestos liability.64 Note that many of these firms are not 
asbestos manufacturers; most manufacturers declared bankruptcy 
well before the time period examined in this sample.65 Instead, the 
firms come from a number of industries and often became exposed to 
asbestos liability by acquiring firms with some early and little-noted 
connection to the asbestos industry.66 These firms are identified 
through the use of a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is 
present on Professor White’s list and zero otherwise. 
Tobacco firms are another widely publicized group of firms with 
potentially large mass tort liabilities. Since the 1990s, tobacco 
companies have become the target of suits from numerous sources, 
including smokers, secondhand smokers, and representatives of states 
 
 63. Although firms in mature industries are unlikely to default on their loans, they may be 
likely to waste their free cash flow on unproductive projects. As a result, high debt loads for 
mature companies may be efficient ways to constrain management from wasting the free cash 
flows. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986). Because risk alteration is not an important 
concern for such companies, however, the need for secured debt, as opposed to other forms of 
debt, is limited. 
 64. See Michelle J. White, Why the Asbestos Genie Won’t Stay in the Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2003). 
 65. For example, the Manville Corporation, the largest asbestos manufacturer, declared 
bankruptcy in 1982. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 66. See, e.g., Note, Successor Liability, Mass Tort, and Mandatory-Litigation Class Action, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2357, 2374–77 (2005) (discussing GAF Corporation’s difficulties as a result 
of asbestos liability assumed by acquiring another company that had made asbestos years 
earlier). 
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and the federal government.67 Although these suits have yet to force 
these firms into bankruptcy, there is a high mass tort bankruptcy risk 
for tobacco firms. State tobacco bond interest rates provide evidence 
of this risk.68 Adverse tort verdicts have made states reluctant to issue 
tobacco bonds securitizing settlement payments from tobacco 
companies.69 Because investors fear that tort liability will force 
tobacco companies into bankruptcy, tobacco bonds carry a high 
interest rate premium. 
Tort risk is a salient characteristic of both tobacco and asbestos 
firms, and it should surprise no one if these firms adopt capital 
structures with this risk in mind. To broaden the sample of high-tort 
firms beyond these two industries, however, a more rigorous method 
of identifying high-tort industries is necessary. This study uses the 
Westlaw databases ALLSTATES and ALLFEDS to assist in this 
task. The procedure for identifying high-tort-risk industries operates 
as follows: First, the official census bureau titles of industries—known 
as the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) titles—were obtained 
from the U.S. Census Bureau.70 Next, the key phrase71 for each three-
digit SIC industry group code title was typed into Westlaw along with 
the following command: 
“[Industry Name]” /s “products liability” 
The resulting hits were recorded. This search gives an indication of 
the number of times an industry is associated with products liability 
risk—the cause of almost all the mass tort bankruptcies heretofore. 
 
 67. For a discussion of many of these suits, see David Hechler, Tobacco Takes It on the 
Chin, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 19, 2003, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1043457953024. 
 68. Tobacco companies have large obligations to states stemming from a large settlement 
of a 1998 class action lawsuit against tobacco companies by many states’ attorneys general. To 
plug large deficits, some states have securitized their receipts from tobacco companies. These 
bonds are called “state tobacco bonds.” See Al Baker & Jonathan Fuerbringer, Shift in Bonds 
Has States Rethinking Tobacco Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at A18. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The Census Bureau gives each industry an official SIC title as well as an official three-
digit SIC Code. For a list of these industrial titles and codes, see SIC Division Structure, 
http://listsareus.com/business-sic-codes.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). 
 71. Many of the SIC titles contain extraneous words. For example, the paper industry is not 
termed the “Paper” industry but rather the “Paper and Allied Products” industry. For this 
study, the key term of each SIC title was used. For example, searches were conducted using the 
word “Paper” and not “Paper and Allied Products.” A list of these phrases is available from the 
author upon request. 
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To control for the fact that some industries’ names are more common 
than others, I conducted another “control” search using the command 
“[Industry Name]” /s “breach of contract” 
and I recorded the resulting hits. Industries that generated a lot of 
hits for the first search simply because they had a common name 
should also have large number of hits on the control search. By 
contrast, industries with genuinely high products liability risk should 
have many more hits on the first search than on the second. The 
industries with large numbers of hits for search 1 but not for search 2 
were identified as high-tort industries with a dummy variable equal to 
one.72 
Although this procedure is imperfect, it provides a rough-and-
ready objective means of identifying industries with high tort risk. 
Furthermore, the results from this procedure are intuitively 
reasonable. The two highest scoring industries according to this 
method were the tobacco and asbestos industries. Other industries 
identified as high tort using the “Westlaw” method include 
pharmaceutical firms, surgical and medical equipment makers, paint 
manufacturers, pesticide makers, tire manufacturers, small arms 
manufacturers, household appliance manufacturers, and toy and 
sporting goods equipment makers. Note that the number of 
pharmaceutical and medical equipment firms dwarfs the number of 
other firms. As a result, this study will treat pharmaceutical and 
medical equipment firms separately from the other group of high-tort 
firms. 
C. Financial Data and Summary Statistics 
This study focuses on manufacturing firms with SIC codes 
between 2000 and 4000. This range includes only manufacturing firms 
and excludes financial and services firms. Financial data for all the 
firms in the sample was collected from Compustat, a proprietary 
database containing detailed financial information for publicly traded 
firms traded on American stock exchanges.73 Table 1 presents 
summary statistics for many of the important variables used in the 
 
 72. “Large” was defined as twice as many hits for search 1 than for search 2. 
 73. Because Compustat focuses on public firms, the conclusions are necessarily speculative 
with respect to closely held firms. Given the strength of the redistributional motive for high-
tort-risk firms, however, a failure of the redistributional prediction for publicly traded firms 
bodes ill for the theory’s predictive power with respect to closely held firms. 
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analysis. The dataset from which these figures are based contains data 
from 5,592 firms.74 For each firm, the dataset contains an average of 
almost seven years of data (6.802 years per firm on average). The 
total number of firm-year observations in the dataset is therefore 
5,592*6.802 = 38,040 firm years. Table 1, as well as all of the other 
included tables, uses the firm (and not the firm year) as the basic unit 
of observation. Thus, the averages in Table 1 are averages of the 
average value for each firm.75 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percent of 
Observations 
at Zero 
Number of 
Observations 
(Firms) 
Secured Debt 
(millions of dollars) 
$36.8 270.3 18.4% 5,581 
Total Long-Term Debt 
(millions of dollars) 
$219.2 1,329.7 8.6% 5,580 
Total Firm Assets 
(millions of dollars) 
$1,065.5 5,951.9 0.0% 5,581 
Property, Plant, and 
Equipment—Total 
(millions of dollars) 
$680.7 4,154.9 0.0% 5,581 
Employees 4,651.2 20,413.6 0.0% 5,425 
Secured Debt–to–Total 
Debt Ratio 
0.31 0.28 18.4% 5,581 
Secured Debt–to–Hard 
Assets Ratio 
0.18 0.24 18.4% 5,581 
Secured Debt–to–Total 
Assets Ratio 
0.09 0.13 18.4% 5,581 
 
 74. This includes pharmaceutical and medical firms. 
 75. To explain further, suppose that Firm A is a representative firm, and there are two 
years (1 and 2) and two variables (secured debt and tort risk). Suppose that in year 1 Firm A has 
1 unit of secured debt and 1 unit of tort risk and that in year 2 Firm A has 1.5 units of secured 
debt and 1 unit of tort risk. Thus, Firm A’s average secured debt is 1.25 = (1+1.5)/2, and Firm 
A’s average tort risk is 1 = (1+1)/2. In calculating the averages presented in Table 1, Firm A is 
entered as one observation with secured debt equal to 1.25 and tort risk equal to 1, rather than 
as two firm-year observations. The reasons for this choice are explained in Part III. See infra 
text accompanying notes 87–88. 
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Compustat collects data for large, publicly traded firms. As a 
result, the average firm in the dataset is large. It has $36.8 million of 
secured debt, $219.2 million of total long-term debt, hard assets of 
over $680 million, total assets of approximately $1.06 billion, and 
more than 4,650 employees. The data for the firms is widely 
dispersed. Note how the standard deviations for many of the variables 
in Table 1 are greater than the means. This occurs because the size 
distribution of the firms in the sample is uneven. There are many 
more smaller-than-average firms in the sample than larger-than-
average firms. A few very large firms help skew the distributions of 
the variables.76 
Not all firms have secured debt. Indeed, approximately 18 
percent of the firms in the sample have no secured debt at all. This 
number is similar to the figure obtained from previous research.77 On 
average, secured debt makes up 31 percent of all debt for firms that 
have at least some debt (the secured debt–to–total debt ratio is .31).78 
Thus, secured debt is an important part of firms’ debt composition, 
although it is far from ubiquitous. Creditors do not hold collateral on 
most of the firms’ assets. In fact, the average firm in the sample has a 
ratio of secured debt to property, plant, and equipment (a term that 
reflects the number of “hard assets” the corporation has) of .18—only 
18 percent of the average firm’s hard assets are securitized, suggesting 
that lack of hard assets does not constrain most firms from issuing 
secured debt. Secured debt comprises an even smaller percentage of 
firms’ total assets; the average secured debt–to–total assets ratio is 
only .09. Note that the secured debt variable includes capitalized 
leases. Thus, the secured debt variable captures any attempt by 
companies to evade tort creditors through long-term “sale and 
leaseback” arrangements or similar types of securitizations. 
 
 76. Note that the values of most variables used infra are capped above and below at the 5 
and 95 percentiles, respectively. This technique helps prevent outliers from driving the results. 
This process does not affect the primary focus of this Article (the use of secured debt by high-
tort-risk firms). It does affect the estimated coefficients of many of the control variables 
presented in Table 3, however. 
 77. See Barclay & Smith, supra note 19, at 904 tbl.II (finding that 24 percent of firms did 
not have secured debt). 
 78. Note that some firms have no debt of any type. These firms do not appear in the 
calculation of the ratio of secured debt to total debt because the ratio is undefined for these 
firms—the denominator, total debt, is zero. This explains why there are fewer firm-year 
observations making up the secured debt–to–total debt ratio as compared with the other ratios 
presented in Table 1. It also explains why the secured debt–to–total debt ratio does not simply 
equal the mean for secured debt amount divided by the mean for total debt amount. 
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III.  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORT RISK AND SECURED DEBT USAGE 
With these stylized facts regarding secured debt usage in mind, I 
examine the relationship between secured debt usage and tort risk, 
and this Part presents the data analysis. It begins with an analysis of 
summary statistics of firms with different tort characteristics. The Part 
continues with Tobit analyses, a form of regression analysis to help 
control for other factors that might be driving any association of 
secured debt usage with tort risk. Finally, the Part relies on time-
series evidence to isolate further the impact of tort risk on secured 
debt usage from other industry specific characteristics driving secured 
debt usage. 
A. Simple Statistical Analysis of Secured Debt Usage 
Recall that the redistributional theory of secured debt predicts 
that firms at risk of tort liability–related bankruptcies should have 
greater amounts of secured debt relative to otherwise similar firms 
that do not have high tort liabilities. Before testing this hypothesis 
through regression analysis, this Section presents some simple 
statistical comparisons of “high-tort” firms with respect to other 
firms. 
Table 2 divides the firms in the sample according to several 
measures of tort risk and compares the ratios of secured debt to hard 
assets and secured debt to total debt for high-tort-risk and low-tort-
risk firms. These ratios are chosen over other measures of secured 
debt usage for several reasons. First, the theoretical literature 
examines the tradeoff between secured debt and other types of debt. 
This tradeoff is best analyzed empirically through the use of the 
secured debt–to–total debt ratio. Second, using a ratio facilitates 
empirical comparisons of firms of very different sizes by putting 
relative secured debt usage of any firm on a comparable scale. 
The first row of Table 2 presents figures for firms that are not 
identified as high tort risks. This group consists of all firms not 
identified as “high tort” using the methods described in Part II. 
Secured debt accounts for 31 percent of total debt for these non-high-
tort “control group” firms, and only 16 percent of the control group 
firm’s hard assets are secured. The low figure suggests that limits on 
securable assets do not constrain non-high-tort firms from obtaining 
more secured debt. 
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Table 2.  Comparative Means and Standard Deviations  
(5,502 firms in the sample) 
Category of Firms 
(number of firm-year observations)
79
 
Secured Debt–
to–Total Debt 
Ratio 
Secured Debt–
to–Hard Assets 
Ratio 
All Firms Not Identified as “High-Tort” Firms
(4,733 firms, 32,180 firm years) 
.31 .18 
Cigarette Firms 
(10 firms, 65 firm years) 
.11 .12 
Firms with Large Asbestos Liabilities 
(6 firms, 57 firm years) 
.15 .18 
Pooled High-Risk Sample 
(18 firms, 130 firm years) 
.12 .13 
High-Tort-Risk Firms Identified by Westlaw 
(156 firms, 987 firm years) 
.24 .21 
Pharmaceutical and Medical Equipment Firms
(613 firms, 7,259 firm years) 
.33 .14 
The second through fifth rows of Table 2 present data for various 
categories of high-tort-risk firms.80 Row two analyzes cigarette 
manufacturers.81 Secured debt accounts for a much lower proportion 
of total debt for tobacco firms than for the average firm not facing 
high tort risk (only 11 percent of total debt for cigarette as compared 
with 31 percent for the control).82 This contradicts the redistributional 
theory’s prediction that high-tort firms should have higher 
proportions of secured debt. Taken alone, this finding means 
relatively little, however. First, the small number of tobacco firms 
(ten) in the sample cautions against making overly broad 
interpretations of the data.83 In addition, non-tort-related differences 
 
 79. A firm-year observation is a datum for a given firm in a given year. Thus, if Compustat 
contains data on secured debt for Firm A for the years 2000 and 2001, then there will be two 
firm-year observations for Firm A. 
 80. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of these categories. 
 81. Note that the cigarette manufacturer statistics are derived from only sixty-seven firm-
year observations. As a result, these figures must be treated more skeptically than the statistics 
presented in the first row. 
 82. A t-test reveals that the cigarette firms’ mean ratio of secured debt to total debt is 
lower than that of the control firms at the 99 percent significance level. This t-test, however, 
treats each firm year as distinct. The true significance level may therefore be somewhat smaller. 
 83. Because the unit of observation is the firm and Table 2 presents averages of averages, 
the data for the ten firms is derived from sixty-five firm years. Thus, the data are more accurate 
than the ten firms figure would initially suggest and, as a result, better inferences can be made. 
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between cigarette firms and the “control group” may be the cause of 
these differences. One possible explanation of these differences 
would be that cigarette firms’ secured debt capacities are limited by 
their securable assets. If so, cigarette firms are unable to obtain more 
secured debt because they have nothing to use as security. The data, 
however, do not support this hypothesis. Cigarette firms have a lower 
ratio of secured debt to hard assets than the control group (12 percent 
as opposed to 18 percent). Moreover, both groups appear to have 
plenty of securable assets available to collateralize loans; less than 20 
percent of hard assets are secured. 
These results repeat themselves for firms facing large asbestos 
liabilities. Firms facing large asbestos liabilities are ideally situated to 
use secured debt for redistribution. Nevertheless, secured debt 
accounts for a smaller proportion of their debt loads than for the 
control group (15 percent for high asbestos liability firms as compared 
to 31 percent for the control group). Here too, the results cannot be 
attributed to lack of securable assets. Secured debt equals only 18 
percent of these firms’ hard assets, making it unlikely that the asset 
constraint is preventing these firms from obtaining more secured 
debt. 
As with cigarettes, however, the results must be treated with 
caution because of the limited size of the asbestos firm sample. To 
address this issue, Table 2 presents a pooled high-risk sample 
consisting of tobacco and asbestos firms as well as two other high 
profile mass tort bankruptcy firms (Dow Corning and A.H. Robins). 
The pooled sample also has considerably lower ratios of secured debt 
to total debt (12 percent) and secured debt to hard assets (13 percent) 
than the control group. Firms in the Westlaw-identified high-tort 
industries84 have considerably lower secured debt proportions than 
the control group of non-high-tort firms. 
The results for pharmaceutical and medical devices firms provide 
limited support for the redistributional theory. Indeed, these firms 
have a slightly higher ratio of secured debt to total debt than the 
control group (33 percent for the pharmaceutical and medical devices 
firms as opposed to 31 percent for other firms). These results should 
be treated with caution for at least two reasons, however. First, the 
link between the pharmaceutical industry and tort risk is far weaker 
 
 84. See supra Part II.B. 
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than for asbestos or tobacco. Second, many other factors may be 
causing these differences. 
Because the simple statistics presented here do not control for a 
myriad of other factors, firm conclusions based on these results are 
impossible. Nevertheless, one observation is justified: redistribution’s 
ability to explain the pattern of secured debt is limited at best. If 
redistribution is a principal determinant of secured debt, then firms 
with near-perfect opportunities to engage in redistribution through 
secured debt should do so, regardless of whatever other factors 
militate against the use of secured debt. The fact that high-tort-risk 
firms such as tobacco and asbestos firms have lower-than-average 
secured debt contradicts the notion that redistribution is a prime 
motive for secured debt. Instead, the data suggest that something 
other than redistributional motives is determining secured debt usage. 
B. Regression Analysis of Secured Debt Usage: Tobit Model 
Simple statistics are instructive, but a robust identification of the 
effects of redistribution on secured debt usage requires more 
sophisticated techniques. Section A demonstrated that firms with 
high tort risk use smaller amounts of secured debt. Although these 
results cast doubt on the redistributional theory of secured debt, their 
reach is limited. To address these concerns and control for other 
determinants of secured debt usage, I turn to regression analysis. 
Previous studies of secured debt identified several non-tort-
related factors affecting secured debt usage.85 These factors include 
market-to-book ratio, earnings, marginal tax rates, size of firm, cash 
availability, and country and state of incorporation. In addition to 
these variables, the regressions control for the year of the observation 
and the exchange upon which the stock is traded. These variables 
control for other potential differences, unrelated to tort risk, between 
high-tort firms and other firms. 
Regressions using secured debt–to–total debt ratios or secured 
debt–to–hard assets ratios have a censored dependent variable. Even 
if a firm “wants” to hold negative amounts of secured debt, the firm 
would not be able to—the minimum amount of secured debt is zero. 
Such censoring can bias the estimates of the effects of various factors 
 
 85. See generally Barclay & Smith, supra note 19 (analyzing various factors that may 
impact the type of securities firms issue, including growth and investment opportunities and tax 
structures); Berger & Udell, supra note 19 (analyzing the relationship between firms’ credit risk 
and the issuance of secured debt). 
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using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. To adjust for the 
bias, this study employs the Tobit model.86 
The appropriate unit of observation for the Tobit regressions is 
also a source of concern. The tort indicator variables vary across 
firms, but they do not vary across years within the same firm; a 
tobacco firm is always a tobacco firm. As a result, a “pooled” Tobit 
regression model treating each firm-year observation as distinct will 
produce inappropriately small standard errors for the effects of tort 
risk. This specification “thinks” there is more data than there actually 
is.87 To address this concern, the unit of observation for the 
regressions will be the mean values across years for each individual 
firm. This procedure reflects the source of variance of the tort-risk 
variables of interest and produces more accurate standard error 
estimates.88 Mathematically, the specification is: 
 
where       is the average (across years) secured debt–to–total debt 
ratio for firm i,      is a vector of control variables averaged across 
years,89       is an indicator variable for whether or not the firm is a 
high-tort-risk firm (several different measures of this risk are used),90 
 
 86. For a discussion of the Tobit model, see ANGUS DEATON, THE ANALYSIS OF 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS 85–92 (1997). Note that the additional assumptions made by the Tobit 
model to correct for the bias caused by censoring, such as homoskedasticity and normality of the 
error terms, are themselves suspect. See id. Indeed, sometimes the Tobit cure is worse than the 
censoring disease. Furthermore, ordinary Tobit regressions treat all observations identically, 
ignoring potential correlations between observations of the same firm in different years. To 
address these concerns, several procedures are employed. The standard errors reported in the 
regressions are estimated using a bootstrap procedure to correct for potential clustering of error 
terms within firms across years. The bootstrap procedure also helps adjust standard errors for 
potential heteroskedasticity. Bootstrapping, however, does not adjust point estimates for 
potential heteroskedasticity biases. Professor James L. Powell’s Censored Least Absolute 
Deviation (CLAD) model, by contrast, produces consistent point estimates in the face of 
heteroskedasticity. See James L. Powell, Least Absolute Deviations Estimation for the Censored 
Regressions Model, 25 J. ECONOMETRICS 303, 303 (1984). As a result, I compare some of the 
Tobit point estimates with estimates produced by the CLAD model. The two procedures 
produce point estimates within 10 percent of each other, suggesting that heteroskedasticity does 
not cause large biases in the Tobit estimates. 
 87. Because there is no variation in tort risk within firms, a fixed-effects regression model is 
not feasible. For more discussion of this issue, see infra Part IV.C.1. 
 88. The standard error estimates for the control variables, however, will tend to be 
underestimated because the regression exploits only between firm and not within-firm variation. 
 89. See supra text around note 85 for a discussion of the control variables. 
 90. For a discussion of these measures, see supra Part II. 
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and   is a normally distributed, homoskedastic error term that is 
uncorrelated with the regressors. If the redistributional theory is 
empirically important (the “null hypothesis” for this study), then the 
tort coefficient (δ ) should be positive and significantly greater than 
zero. If the redistributional theory does not have predictive power, 
then (δ ) may be zero or even negative. 
Table 391 presents results of Tobit regressions using this 
specification.92 Even after controlling for many other factors, Table 3 
shows that tobacco firms use less secured debt than other firms. Being 
a tobacco firm is associated with a “desired”93 decline in a firm’s 
secured debt–to–total debt ratio of approximately .14, ceteris 
paribus—a substantial decrease. This estimated effect is imprecisely 
estimated, however. Indeed, the coefficient estimate is not 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. The results are 
more significant (both statistically and economically) for the sample 
of firms that ultimately declare bankruptcy as a result of asbestos 
liability. These firms have a “desired” secured debt–to–total debt 
ratio that is .48 lower than would otherwise be expected.94 
 
 91. Results based on Tobit regressions of firm’s secured debt–to–hard debt ratios 
(dependent variable) on the variables listed in the table. Each regression has approximately 
4,300 separate observations and includes other (statistically insignificant) control variables such 
as the standard deviation of earnings and a dummy variable for tax carry forwards. 
 92. The results presented here are robust to the inclusion of many other potential control 
variables, including standard deviation of earnings, dummy variables for the presence of tax 
carryforwards, and measures of abnormal earnings. Note also that the regressions do not 
include firms that are in bankruptcy because their financial data may be radically altered by the 
bankruptcy process. In addition, the results are robust to the use of other dependent variables. 
For example, using the ratio of secured debt to market value, rather than the ratio of secured 
debt to total debt, does not change the results appreciably with the exception of the 
pharmaceutical firms’ regression. This exception is not surprising given the high value of 
intangibles for pharmaceutical firms. 
 93. Because the topic of interest is the impact of tort liability on the underlying propensity 
of firms to use secured debt for both firms that do and do not currently have secured debt, the 
ordinary Tobit regressions coefficients are the appropriate coefficient of interest. This 
interpretation applies to all of the regression results. Note that the values cannot be 
mechanically applied to other potential values of interest, such as the impact of a change in 
tort’s priority structure on the probability that firms will issue any secured debt. Instead, other 
adjusted estimates must be used. For a helpful discussion of the interpretation of Tobit 
coefficients, see generally Lee Sigelman & Langche Zeng, Analyzing Censored and Sample-
Selected Data with Tobit and Heckit Models, 8 POL. ANALYSIS 167 (1999). 
 94. When a dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm ever declares bankruptcy 
during the time period is included in this regression, the effect of being an asbestos firm has an 
even larger downward impact on secured debt amounts. This is because the average (non-
asbestos) firm that declares bankruptcy has an above-average ratio of secured debt, making the 
asbestos companies’ low secured debt usage even more exceptional. 
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This estimate is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, 
although the estimate is still quite imprecise. The imprecision of the 
tobacco and asbestos company tort-risk estimates is not surprising—
very few companies can be clearly identified as tobacco or asbestos 
liability–risk companies, meaning that the small sample size limits the 
statistical power of the regressions. Nevertheless, the magnitude of 
the negative effect of high tort risk contradicts the redistributional 
theory of secured debt. In addition, Table 3 presents the statistics of 
the pooled asbestos and tobacco companies to help address the 
limited sample issue. When these two groups of high-tort companies 
are combined, the results are both economically and statistically 
significant. High-tort-risk companies with asbestos or tobacco liability 
have secured debt–to–total debt ratios that are .25 below expectation, 
ceteris paribus. 
The fourth column identifies tort risk using Westlaw to identify 
industries subject to considerable products liability risk. The group of 
companies identified using this procedure is considerably larger than 
the group of tobacco or asbestos companies, enabling more precise 
identification. The link between potential mass tort bankruptcies and 
tort risk is weaker for the “Westlaw group,” however, because it 
includes companies and industries wherein mass tort risk is 
considerably smaller than for the asbestos or tobacco industries. As 
expected, the Westlaw tort-risk variable coefficient is both smaller in 
size and more precisely estimated than the tort-risk coefficients in the 
first three columns. Companies in high-tort industries have secured 
debt–to–total debt ratios that are .071 lower than expected. Thus, the 
pattern recurs—high-tort companies have less secured debt than 
expected. Although (as predicted) the magnitude of the effect goes 
down considerably, the effect remains statistically significant. 
The final column of Table 3 examines secured debt usage 
amongst pharmaceutical firms and medical equipment 
manufacturers.95 This is a large group of companies, enabling greater 
statistical precision. As with the tort-risk firms examined by Westlaw, 
however, the salience of tort risk for these firms is considerably 
smaller than for firms facing tobacco and asbestos liability. Yet again, 
both the size of the estimated “tort effect” and the standard error of 
this estimate are smaller than the coefficients reported for asbestos or 
tobacco firms. Interestingly, pharmaceutical firms are the only tort-
 
 95. The results do not change appreciably if these two categories are separated. 
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risk firms with greater secured debt usage than other firms, other 
things being equal. The size of the positive effect is quite small but 
statistically significant.96 Indeed, the magnitude of the positive effect 
on secured debt usage is considerably smaller than the negative 
effects witnessed for the other categories of tort risk. Because the 
other categories of tort risk are more plausible tests of the 
redistributive hypothesis, the small positive effect found for the 
pharmaceutical and medical equipment manufacturers regression 
does not appear to offer compelling evidence for the redistributive 
hypothesis. 
The impact of other factors on secured debt usage generally 
comport with previous estimates.97 A firm’s market-to-book ratio is an 
indicator of future investment opportunities and growth options. 
Because secured debt hinders a firm’s ability to take advantage of 
growth opportunities (by allowing a creditor to limit the uses of a 
given asset), one would expect firms with high market-to-book ratios 
to have low secured debt levels. Indeed, previous studies have found 
that “firms with more growth options . . . (as proxied by high market-
to-book ratios) issue significantly fewer fixed claims [including 
secured debt].”98 The results in Table 3 confirm these results, as a 
higher market-to-book ratio is associated with a statistically 
significant, but economically small, lowering in the amount of secured 
debt. Another robust conclusion regarding secured debt is that large 
firms use less secured debt than small firms.99 The regressions 
reported here replicate this finding. Firms with higher value have less 
secured debt as a proportion of total debt, although the effect is not 
statistically significant. Marginal tax rates have little to no impact on 
secured debt ratios—also a finding that has been made in previous 
empirical studies.100 The regressions confirm this hypothesis, with cash 
being negatively associated with secured debt proportions. Foreign 
firms consistently have less secured debt in the regressions. This may 
be caused by the fact that foreign firms traded on U.S. markets are 
unusually large and successful firms. 
 
 96. High secured debt usage by pharmaceutical companies is consistent with principal 
agent explanations of secured debt. In a research-driven, high-risk, high-return field such as 
pharmaceuticals, the principal-agent problems that secured debt potentially mitigates are 
particularly salient. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 97. See generally Barclay & Smith, supra note 19. 
 98. Id. at 908. For the full results, see id. at 905 tbl.III. 
 99. Id. at 906 tbl.IV. 
 100. Id. at 911 tbl.V. 
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Firms that pay high amounts of dividends to common 
shareholders have considerably less secured debt than other firms. 
Firms paying dividends have ample cash flow to finance their own 
operations (otherwise they would not be paying discretionary 
dividends) and are therefore unlikely to submit to the monitoring and 
restrictions imposed by secured debt. One surprising result of the 
regressions is that firms with higher annual income as a proportion of 
fixed assets have higher secured debt–to–total debt ratios. This result 
appears counterintuitive. One would think that more profitable 
companies would have less need for secured debt, yet the opposite 
phenomenon is observed. The size of the impact is considerably less 
than the negative impact of dividends, however. Combining these two 
results, the regressions suggest that mature and profitable firms have 
less secured debt as a proportion of total debt than other firms. 
In total, the results of the Tobit regressions support the tentative 
conclusions made in Section A. Even after controlling for many other 
variables affecting secured debt usage, firms with high tort risk use 
less secured debt, contradicting the redistributional theory of secured 
debt. 
C. Time-Series Analysis 
Cross-sectional regressions such as those presented in Table 3 
are far from perfect, however. If any unobserved variables are 
correlated with the variables presented in the regression, then the 
regression estimates may be biased. To examine this possibility, this 
Section turns to time-series analysis. 
Two obstacles prevent ordinary time-series fixed-effects 
regression with the data presented here. First, the Compustat data 
constitute an exceedingly unbalanced panel. Few firms appear 
unchanged in the database for the entire eleven-year span of the data. 
Many firms merge, are acquired, go private, or become bankrupt over 
the years in the database. As a result, firm-level fixed-effects 
regressions are subject to many sources of bias. Second, fixed-effects 
regressions require within-unit variation in the variable of interest. 
The “high-tort” identification techniques do not provide for within-
firm variation in tort risk. Another source of variation is required. To 
address these difficulties, this Article employs two related 
specifications. 
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1. Tobacco Industry “Fixed Effects.”  Because the turnover in 
firms makes ordinary fixed-effects regressions of firm-level data 
impractical, this Section adopts the industry as the unit of 
observation. Although there is considerable turnover in firms within 
industries, each industry (as represented by a three-digit SIC code) 
remains far more stable. As a result, this Section creates industry 
level “observations” with a weighted average of all firms in a given 
industry in a given year.101 
The tobacco industry offers a promising source of within-industry 
tort-risk variation. Tobacco firms’ products liability has been steadily 
increasing throughout the years in the sample. The threat to firm 
survival caused by tobacco liability was much lower in 1990 than in 
2001. For example, a search of major U.S. news sources on the 
LexisNexis database found that the words “tobacco,” “products 
liability,” and “bankruptcy” only appeared in the same sentence three 
times during the years 1990 through 1993. The same combination of 
words appeared in the same sentence nineteen times during the 1994–
1997 period and fifty-six times during the 1998–2001 period, strongly 
suggesting that the risk of mass tort bankruptcy was increasing for 
tobacco firms from 1990–2001. The redistributional theory predicts 
that secured debt usage should increase as the tort liability risk of 
tobacco companies increased during the 1990s. 
Table 4 examines secured debt usage for tobacco companies 
relative to other companies as tobacco liability increased through the 
1990s. Table 4 presents average industry ratios of secured debt to 
total debt for industry categories for the years 1990–1993, 1994–1997, 
and 1998–2001, respectively. As the numbers indicate, the tobacco 
industry did not increase its secured debt usage over time, despite 
increasing tobacco liability during the decade. The tobacco industry 
employed little secured debt throughout the process.102 Secured debt 
makes up slightly greater than 1 percent of total debt in the 1990–
1993 and 1994–1997 periods. This number decreases to below 1 
percent for the 1998–2001 period, in spite of the increase in tobacco 
liability. Secured debt usage in other industries also decreased, from 
22 percent to 19 percent. In percentage terms, tobacco firms’ secured 
 
 101. See DEATON, supra note 86, at 116–27 (describing the method of econometric analysis 
employed here). 
 102. The numbers in Table 4 represent weighted averages. Because larger firms tend to have 
less secured debt than other firms, the weighted averages are lower than the unweighted 
averages presented in Table 2. 
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debt went down more than other firms’. Thus, the evidence once 
again contradicts the redistributional theory’s prediction. 
Table 4.  Secured Debt Usage and Changes in Tort  
Liability Over Time103 
 Secured Debt– 
to–Total Debt 
Ratio 1990–1993 
Secured Debt– 
to–Total Debt 
Ratio 1994–1997 
Secured Debt–
to–Total Debt 
Ratio 1998–2001 
Tobacco Industry .011 .011 .007 
All Other 
Industries 
.22 .20 .19 
2. Secured Debt Usage and the Approach of Bankruptcy.  
Examining the use of secured debt by firms approaching bankruptcy 
provides another means of determining whether or not secured debt 
is used for redistribution. As bankruptcy approaches, the expected 
value of secured debt’s redistributional capacity increases.104 With 
bankruptcy more probable, the value of secured debt’s priority over 
other creditor classes grows larger. If the redistributional theory has 
explanatory power, then all firms in financial distress should therefore 
issue disproportionate amounts of secured debt, all other things 
equal. Ordinary firms’ ability to issue redistributional secured debt 
will be constrained by pledge covenants held by contract creditors. 
Tort claimants such as asbestos claimants, by contrast, hold no such 
covenants. As a result, the larger the share of a firm’s liabilities held 
by tort claimants, the easier it will be for a firm to issue secured debt 
to redistribute value away from creditors. In other words, firms facing 
mass tort bankruptcy should issue even more secured debt than other 
firms in financial distress. 
This Section tests this hypothesis. First, I obtained a sample of all 
firms declaring bankruptcy between the years 1995 and 2002 from 
Compustat. This restriction ensures that the analysis compares firms 
in similar states of financial distress; any differences between the 
secured debt levels of the high-tort companies are not the result of 
differential levels of financial distress because all of the companies 
declared bankruptcy at approximately the same time. I then compare 
 
 103. Weighted average of secured debt–to–total debt ratios for all of the firms in the 
tobacco industry. Average of weighted industry averages of secured debt–to–total debt ratios 
for the “all other industries” category. 
 104. See, e.g., Scott, Truth About Secured Financing, supra note 2, at 1458. 
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the sample of bankrupt companies with the list of asbestos-related 
mass tort bankruptcies compiled by Professor White.105 Five 
companies appear in both samples.106 In addition, the mass tort 
bankruptcy list includes the Dow Corning Corporation, a prominent 
non-asbestos mass tort bankruptcy.107 I assume that these six 
companies are mass tort–related bankruptcies, and that the other 
companies in the sample are ordinary bankruptcies. If the 
redistributional theory is correct, then the mass tort bankruptcy 
companies should have more secured debt as they approach 
bankruptcy than the “control group” of companies.108 
The data contradict the redistributional theory’s prediction. 
Firms approaching mass tort–related bankruptcies hold considerably 
less secured debt than other firms approaching bankruptcy. The first 
row of Table 5 displays data for firms that will declare bankruptcy as 
a result of mass tort liabilities within one year. These six firms do not 
have high proportions of secured debt. Their secured debt–to–hard 
assets ratio is just .08, while their secured debt–to–total debt ratio is 
.07. Firms within a year of bankruptcy that do not have abnormally 
large tort liabilities (the second row) have considerably higher 
proportions of secured debt. The nontort firms’ secured debt–to–hard 
assets ratio is .30, while their secured debt–to–total debt ratio is also 
.30. Thus, firms not facing large tort liabilities hold approximately 
four times the proportion of secured debt when compared with firms 
approaching mass tort bankruptcy. T-tests of the hypothesis that the 
non–mass tort firms have a higher secured debt–to–hard debt ratio 
and a higher secured debt–to–total debt ratio than the mass tort firms 
 
 105. See White, supra note 64, at 1320 n.8. 
 106. Missing data issues prevent more overlap between the two lists. To be included in this 
subset, a firm needed to have complete data for the four years preceding bankruptcy. As a 
result, a number of firms on Professor White’s list cannot be included in the data analysis in this 
Section. The five companies are Federal Mogul, Inc; W.R. Grace & Co.; Kaiser Aluminum and 
Chemical, Inc.; Owens Corning, Inc.; and Solutia, Inc. Although Professor White’s article lists 
many other asbestos-related bankruptcies, the other corporations mentioned in her list do not 
appear in the Compustat database. 
 107. See In re Dow Corning Inc., 86 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1996). Dow Corning’s 
bankruptcy was filed in response to large products liability claims related to silicone gel breast 
implants. Id. 
 108. Note that although the firms in the mass tort group obviously share the characteristic of 
large tort liabilities, they do not share many other traits. For example, the six firms come from 
five different SIC categories. As a result, it is unlikely (although not impossible) that the 
differences between the high-tort sample and the control group stem solely from unobserved 
differences unrelated to tort liability. 
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are significant at the 97 percent and 99 percent confidence levels, 
respectively, in spite of the very small sample size of high-tort firms. 
Table 5.  Secured Debt Amounts, Mass Tort Liabilities, and the 
Approach of Bankruptcy 
Category of Firms 
(Number of Firms) 
Secured Debt–to–Hard 
Assets Ratio  
(Standard Error of 
Estimate) 
Secured Debt–to–
Total Debt Ratio  
(Standard Error of 
Estimate) 
Firms with Large Tort 
Liabilities within One Year 
of Bankruptcy (6 firms) 
.08 
(.078) 
.07 
(.055) 
Firms without Large Tort 
Liabilities within One ear of 
Bankruptcy (50 firms) 
.30 
(.067) 
.30 
(.053) 
Firms with Large Tort 
Liabilities Two Years from 
Bankruptcy (6 firms) 
.17 
(.165) 
.15 
(.131) 
Firms without Large Tort 
Liabilities Two Years from 
Bankruptcy (48 firms) 
.31 
(.067) 
.31 
(.059) 
Firms with Large Tort 
Liabilities Four Years from 
Bankruptcy (5 firms) 
.01 
(.005) 
.01 
(.012) 
Firms without Large Tort 
Liabilities Four Years from 
Bankruptcy (40 firms) 
.30 
(.056) 
.28 
(.070) 
This pattern of secured debt recurs as the lag between the 
observation year and the year of the bankruptcy declaration grows 
longer. For example, the data for firms within two years of a 
bankruptcy declaration are strongly similar to the data for firms 
within one year of bankruptcy. Firms within two years of mass tort 
bankruptcies have considerably less secured debt than firms within 
two years of bankruptcy that do not have large tort liabilities, 
although the absolute difference in secured debt proportions between 
the two categories is smaller than when the firms are within one year 
of bankruptcy. When the firms are four years from bankruptcy, the 
difference in secured debt amounts is greater, with mass tort 
bankruptcy firms having almost no secured debt, while the “control 
group” of firms continues to have reasonably high amounts. In total, 
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there is one robust conclusion: high-tort firms consistently have less 
secured debt than other firms near bankruptcy. 
This finding strongly negates the redistributional theory. If 
secured debt is used to redistribute value away from nonadjusting 
creditors, then surely firms with large numbers of unprotected tort 
creditors should use large amounts of secured debt for redistribution 
when they are within one year of declaring bankruptcy. The 
redistributional benefits of secured debt will never be more obvious 
or appealing. The fact that such firms actually have smaller-than-
average and rapidly decreasing amounts of secured debt as 
bankruptcy draws closer appears to present a strong refutation to the 
redistributional theory of secured debt. 
IV.  EVALUATION OF THE STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The previous Part examined the redistributional theory’s 
predictions regarding the use of secured debt in response to tort risk. 
The theory’s prediction—that secured debt should be used to 
redistribute value away from tort claimants—was refuted in a number 
of different specifications. Indeed, high-tort firms typically had lower 
secured debt amounts than otherwise similar firms without tort risk. 
Because tort claimants are ripe for redistribution, these results 
suggest that redistributional motives are not an empirically important 
determinant of secured debt usage. 
Although these findings are difficult to interpret in the context of 
the redistributional theory, they are less puzzling according to other 
theories. Agency theories, for example, make no strong predictions 
regarding secured debt usage by high-tort-risk firms. High-tort-risk 
firms are no more likely to suffer from agency problems than other 
firms. As a result, the agency cost–reducing characteristics of secured 
debt should be no more attractive for high-tort-risk firms than for 
other firms. 
One variant of the agency cost theory of secured debt offers a 
particularly compelling explanation for these empirical results. 
Professors Patrick Bolton and David S. Scharfstein suggest that 
decisions regarding the distribution of debt priorities may be 
understood by focusing on two types of defaults: liquidity defaults, in 
which a firm lacks the cash to make debt payments; and strategic 
defaults, which result from opportunistic behavior by managers.109 
 
 109. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 30, at 2. 
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Bolton and Scharfstein argue that the efficient type of debt depends 
upon the relative probabilities of strategic and liquidity defaults. If 
strategic defaults are more likely, then types of debt that deter 
opportunistic defaults are more desirable, even if these debt types 
raise the cost of reorganization in bankruptcy. When liquidity defaults 
are more likely, then debt that is easily restructured becomes more 
desirable because it reduces costs in liquidity defaults. 
Applying this framework to secured debt,110 secured debt reduces 
the incentive for strategic defaults by giving creditors the right to 
liquidate the company’s assets following a default and reducing the 
possibility of reorganization, thus punishing the managers for their 
opportunistic behavior. This corresponds to the agency cost–reducing 
features of secured debt. These features of secured debt are less 
attractive in a liquidity default because they raise the costs of 
bankruptcy and reduce the chances of a potentially efficient 
reorganization. 
Thus, secured debt will be least attractive when the probability of 
liquidity defaults is high relative to the probability of strategic 
defaults. Firms facing mass tort bankruptcies fall into this category. 
The probability of a liquidity default is high for these firms. If courts 
and juries find them liable for sufficiently high damages (a real 
possibility for many of these firms), then liquidity default will follow. 
Strategic defaults are relatively less likely, by contrast. Tobacco firms 
and the firms that fell victim to asbestos liability tended to be 
relatively mature firms with healthy cash flows, making them unlikely 
candidates for opportunistic defaults. At a minimum, there is no 
reason to think that high-tort firms face unusually high strategic 
default possibilities that outweigh the abnormally large risk of 
liquidity defaults. Furthermore, high-tort-risk firms are more likely 
candidates for reorganization than the average liquidity-defaulting 
firms. High-tort firms do not default because of an unhealthy business 
model, but rather because of large amounts of tort liability.111 
 
 110. Bolton and Scharfstein offer a brief analysis of secured debt. See id. at 16–17. Their 
analysis does not focus on the tradeoff between secured and unsecured debt, but rather on the 
choice of the number of secured creditors. Id. As a result, their conclusions are different than 
those presented here. 
 111. Frequently, the tort liability stems from previous actions and is relatively independent 
of the companies’ current business. Many of the asbestos companies in a later wave of 
bankruptcies acquired their liabilities from successor corporations. See, e.g., Krull v. Celotex 
Corp., 611 F. Supp. 146, 148 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (describing the Celotex acquisition of asbestos 
liability from predecessor corporations). Their current businesses do not suffer from unusually 
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Anything that makes reorganization more difficult, such as secured 
debt, should be particularly unattractive for these firms.112 In total, 
these considerations may explain why the high-tort-risk firms had less 
secured debt than otherwise comparable firms without significant tort 
risk. 
CONCLUSION 
The empirical results presented in this Article strongly suggest 
that companies do not use secured debt to expropriate value from 
tort claimants. Indeed, firms facing mass tort bankruptcy have less 
debt than otherwise comparable firms without high tort liabilities. 
This finding has numerous policy implications. Many commentators, 
fearing that firms would use secured debt for redistribution, have 
advocated superpriority for tort claimants.113 The fears upon which 
these proposals are based are unfounded, however. Corporations do 
not use secured debt with priority to diminish the bankruptcy 
realizations of their tort claimants. 
These results do not imply that superpriority for tort claimants 
should be rejected out of hand. Tort deterrence is still greater with 
superpriority than under the prevailing system, even if companies do 
not exploit the priority structure to the detriment of tort claimants. 
Nevertheless, superpriority for tort claimants must be treated with 
greater skepticism in light of these results. All of the rationales for 
superpriority depend upon the redistributional theory in some 
degree. Because the results presented in this Article cast serious 
doubt upon the redistributional theory and suggest that agency cost 
considerations dominate secured debt decisions, policymakers should 
hesitate before making decisions that may hinder secured debt’s 
agency cost–reducing abilities. 
This conclusion applies to partial priority proposals more 
generally. These proposals stem from fears of secured debt’s 
redistributional capabilities.114 If firms are not using secured debt for 
 
large tort risk. As a result, many high-tort-risk companies operate healthy businesses even after 
considering future tort risk. 
 112. Managers of high-tort-risk firms may care more about the consequences of bankruptcy 
than the typical managers of a firm. Because high-tort-risk firms do not declare bankruptcy as a 
result of poor businesses, the managers may be unusually likely to lead the reorganized firm and 
may therefore care more about bankruptcy consequences than the typical manager. 
 113. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Bebchuck & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 865–66, 891–904. 
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redistribution, however, then these proposals lose much of their 
analytic force—policymakers should not change priority rules to 
account for an empirically insignificant problem. 
Finally, these results show that reports of the death of liability 
are greatly exaggerated. If firms do not adjust their capital structures 
to exploit the seemingly easy redistribution opportunity offered by 
secured debt’s priority over tort claimants, then they are exceedingly 
unlikely to adopt more radical techniques that would enable firms to 
avoid liability completely. Future research is necessary, but such 
research may well show that other causes of the death of liability, 
such as undercapitalization, are just as empirically irrelevant as 
redistribution through secured debt. 
 
